In a unanimous decision, the justices said that the four Republicans were not entitled to sue in an effort to replace a redistricting plan ordered by a court with one passed by a Republican-controlled state legislature.

A Democratic state judge drew up the first redistricting plan in 2002, while the Republican Legislature drew one up in 2003.

The court plan had been put in place when a divided Colorado General Assembly was unable to agree on one in time for the 2002 election.

In their lawsuit, the Republican voters say the court-imposed map violates a right of citizens under the U.S. Constitution to vote for congressional candidates in districts created by state legislatures.

In an unsigned opinion, the justices said that the only injury the Republican voters allege is that the Elections Clause had not been followed.

"This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past," the court stated.

Citing earlier rulings, the justices said the Republicans must have more than a general interest common to all members of the public in order to pursue the case.

Last year, a U.S. District Court in Colorado had ruled that the Republicans could proceed with their lawsuit asserting an Elections Clause violation.

The Colorado case is the Supreme Court's latest foray into congressional redistricting battles. Last year, the justices addressed a messy redistricting fight in Texas, ruling that the Constitution does not bar states from redrawing political lines in mid-decade when one party or the other senses an advantage.

The decision grew out of a court review of a Texas redistricting plan orchestrated in 2003 by Tom DeLay, who was a Republican congressional leader at the time.

The Colorado dispute also involved a lawsuit brought by the Democratic state attorney general. It led to a Colorado Supreme Court decision against the Republican legislative plan in 2003. The Colorado Supreme Court said the state constitution restricts congressional redistricting to once per decade and that the legislature's plan was the second plan.

A three judge panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit threw out a lawsuit challenging Ohio's death penalty procedure Friday on the grounds that the claim was filed too late. In the 2-1 opinion, judges Richard Fred Suhrheinrich and Edward Eugene Siler decided that the statute of limitations on the inmate's 42 USC 1983 method of execution challenge would have run at the latest two years following the 2001 decision that made lethal injection Ohio's only form of execution. Plaintiff Cooey did not file his challenge until December of 2004.

Last year Ohio executed its first prisoner using modified lethal injection procedures aimed at preventing extreme pain during an execution. The procedures were changed last June following a difficult May execution where staff struggled to find a vein to administer the lethal injection cocktail, and the one they did use collapsed before injection.

A disbarred lawyer indicted on charges of stealing about $750,000 from former clients pleaded not guilty at his arraignment yesterday.

Peter L. Schofield, 54, of 52 North St., Grafton, was arraigned in Worcester Superior Court on nine counts of larceny of more than $250, crimes he allegedly committed on various dates from Aug. 1, 2002, to March 13 of last year. He was indicted last month.

The Lithuanian War Veterans Organization alleges Mr. Schofield stole more than $500,000. 

Judge John S. McCann set bail of $5,000 cash, as requested by Assistant District Attorney Herbert F. Travers III, and continued Mr. Schofield’s case to March 20. Mr. Schofield’s lawyer, Sean R. Holland, did not object to the prosecutor’s bail request, and Mr. Schofield was released after posting the $5,000.

Mr. Schofield and Mr. Holland declined to comment on the charges after the arraignment.

Mr. Schofield, a real estate lawyer who was admitted to the bar in 1985, was disbarred May 25 based on a New York couple’s allegations that he stole more than $84,000 from them in the sale of property they owned in Grafton. Checks totaling $84,274 that Mr. Schofield sent from his trustee account to the husband and wife, Brian and Deborah Larsen, bounced, according to a Board of Bar Overseers’ summary of the allegations that led to Mr. Schofield’s disbarment.

The Larsens are listed as victims in two of the indictments against Mr. Schofield. The indictments were returned by a grand jury Feb. 16.

Another of his alleged victims is the Lithuanian War Veterans Organization Inc., which filed a civil lawsuit against Mr. Schofield last year. The suit alleges that Mr. Schofield stole some of the proceeds from the $560,000 sale of the organization’s headquarters on South Quinsigamond Avenue in Shrewsbury to Adelphi Inc. of Shrewsbury, a branch of the Knights of Columbus.

The veterans group, which hired Mr. Schofield to complete the 2004 sale and resolve related legal matters, is seeking $600,000 in damages in its civil action.

The indictments list eight other alleged larceny victims, all former clients of Mr. Schofield.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed a complaint Tuesday against the Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking the release of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) order that authorized government surveillance of transmissions coming into or going outside of the country where one party was suspected of association with a terrorist organization.

The EFF filed their complaint under Section 552(a)(4)(B) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which grants the federal court "jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant." The EFF complaint alleges that the DOJ denied the EFF's January 23, 2007 FOIA request seeking:

copies of all Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court...orders referenced by the Attorney General in his letter to Sens. Leahy and Specter, and all FISC rules and guidelines associated with such orders and/or referenced by Mr. Snow in the January 17 press briefing.

Gonzales revealed the existence of the FISC order in January through a letter to Sens. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Arlen Specter (R-PA), chairman and ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in which Gonzales announced that Bush administration will submit all domestic surveillance requests to the FISC for review and approval under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. While maintaining the legality of the NSA domestic surveillance program, Gonzales said in the letter that the President will not reauthorize the program when its current authorization expires, and will instead submit all surveillance requests through the FISC.

A grand jury in Mississippi Tuesday refused to indict Carolyn Bryant on charges of manslaughter for the 1955 kidnap and murder of Emmett Till due to a lack of sufficient evidence. Carolyn is the wife of Rob Bryant, who, along with his half brother J.W. Milam, was acquitted in 1955 by an all-white jury on all charges related to the murder. Rob Bryant later confessed to the killing. A friend of Till called the grand jury's decision racist, telling AP "we had overwhelming evidence, and they came back with the same decision. Some people haven't changed from 50 years ago."

The Till case leads a series of attempts by federal law enforcement authorities to settle unfinished civil rights cases. Following a probe of investigative errors, the US Justice Department re-opened the case in 2004. Last year, the FBI reported that no federal civil rights charges would be filed in the Emmett Till case, and subsequently turned over to the local Mississippi district attorney.

The Supreme Court finds itself smack in the middle of a big debate over high-speed chases.

Officers in Georgia were chasing a speeding Victor Harris in 2001 when a cruiser rammed Harris' Cadillac at roughly 90 miles-per-hour, sending him into an embankment and leaving him paralyzed.

Harris sued Deputy Timothy Scott for violating his civil rights by using excessive force. Scott said he was trying to end the chase before anybody got hurt. Two lower courts sided with Harris.

This will be the first time in more than 20 years that the high court considers constitutional limits on police use of deadly force to stop fleeing suspects.

Harris' lawyer argues something more serious than a traffic violation has to occur before such force is used. Scott's attorney counters he didn't use excessive force, and that Harris was driving recklessly.

The Supreme Court hears arguments this week in a case that will test the limits of what officers can do to stop speeding drivers in high-speed chases.

At issue before the court is whether a Georgia police officer went too far when he rammed his vehicle into a car driven by a fleeing 19-year-old -- a maneuver that left the motorist paralyzed.

Law enforcement officers around the country are anxiously watching the case, concerned that a ruling for the quadriplegic driver would put them in legal jeopardy for split-second decisions at crime scenes.

Meanwhile, civil liberties advocates and critics of police chases are concerned that a ruling for the officer in the case would give law enforcement the green light to use more aggressive tactics on the roads.

Law enforcement agencies should "authorize high-speed pursuits only when necessary," said Karen Blum, a law professor at Suffolk University in Boston, who filed a brief in the case for the National Police Accountability Project. "The tactics employed by (the officer in this case) present serious issues of police accountability and raise questions about police tactics."

The chase occurred in 2001 in Coweta County, Ga., a community about 30 miles southwest of Atlanta. Victor Harris, 19 at the time, was clocked driving 73 mph in a 55-mph zone. A county sheriff flashed his lights and turned on his siren, but Harris hit the gas and sped away. Deputy Timothy Scott joined the pursuit, which lasted for six minutes and covered almost 9 miles.

A trial court found that Harris drove between 70 and 90 mph, ran through two red lights, and bumped Scott's vehicle once. Nevertheless, Harris still used his turn indicators when passing other cars on the largely vacant roads.

Scott radioed a supervisor and got permission to use a "precision intervention technique" -- a maneuver for hitting another car that causes it to spin and then stop. But the deputy ultimately abandoned the technique because he and Harris were driving too fast on a wet, two-lane highway.

Instead, Scott hit Harris' car with his push bumper -- a move that caused the vehicle to careen down an embankment. Harris, who was not wearing a seat belt, was paralyzed from the neck down.

Harris filed a lawsuit against Scott, alleging violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment's guarantees against unreasonable seizures and excessive force.

A federal district court in Georgia ruled that the deputy could be held liable in civil court for using deadly force without having probable cause to believe the teenager had committed a serious crime or posed a threat to others. In December 2005, the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that decision.

Scott appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court, which hears oral arguments in the case on Monday.

The deputy was acting "reasonably," argued his attorney, Philip Savrin, because a "fleeing car can be a deadly weapon" and Scott "believed that his actions avoided a greater risk of serious injury or death."

Savrin added: "Scott personally observed Harris driving recklessly and dangerously at extremely high speeds, through red lights and on the wrong side of the road. Scott properly recognized that Harris was a continuing danger to the public, and he acted reasonably to defuse the danger."

The Supreme Court's ruling in the case is expected to set new benchmarks for when and how law enforcement officers can chase suspects and use their vehicles to stop them.

The issue is murky because the previous two rulings on the use of deadly force were roughly two decades ago -- and those did not deal with car chases.

For instance, in 1985, the Supreme Court said deadly force can be used when a suspect threatens an officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime causing serious physical harm.

In 1989, the high court said judges deciding whether the use of deadly force is reasonable must weigh the underlying crime involved, the immediate threat a suspect poses and whether the suspect is actively evading arrest.

Harris' attorney, Craig Jones, argued that Harris' only offense at the beginning of the police chase was speeding -- a relatively minor crime that did not warrant such a risky pursuit.

Jones warned that a ruling against his client would give law enforcement officers carte blanche to recklessly and "knowingly apply deadly force in circumstances when no life is in immediate danger in order to seize a fleeing traffic offender."