Fisher & Phillips LLP has hired an associate to work with the law firm’s growing immigration business practice. Jessica Cook has been practicing law for two years focusing on business immigration, labor and employment law, and general civil litigation with the firm Woods Rogers PLC in Roanoke, Virginia. Ms. Cook is a Virginia native.

Ms. Cook earned her law degree from William & Mary in 2004 and graduated summa cum laude from Oakwood College in Huntsville, Alabama.

Fisher & Phillips Partner David Whitlock, who heads the firm’s business immigration practice, said, “Jessica brings important business immigration law experience to the firm at a time when we are seeing a marked increase in the work our clients need. Our clients and the firm are fortunate to be able to attract someone who can immediately have an impact in a field of law that is increasingly important to business owners.”

The firm’s immigration business practice includes extensive visa work, handling both temporary and permanent visa cases, as well as advice regarding compliance with the I-9, discrimination, and document abuse provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The firm also handles litigation arising under that statute.

About Fisher & Phillips

Fisher & Phillips LLP (www.laborlawyers.com) is one of the largest national law firms in the field of labor and employment law, with 200 attorneys in 17 offices. Founded in 1943, it was one of the first U.S. law firms to concentrate its practice exclusively upon representation of employers in labor and employment matters. In addition to its Atlanta headquarters, the firm also has offices in Charlotte, Chicago, Columbia, Dallas, Fort Lauderdale, Houston, Irvine, Kansas City, Las Vegas, New Jersey, New Orleans, Orlando, Portland, San Diego, San Francisco, and Tampa.

http://www.laborlawyers.com

Microsoft has been ordered by a U.S. jury to pay $1.52 billion in a patent dispute over the MP3 digital file format, the technology at the heart of the digital music boom.

If upheld on appeal, it would be the largest patent judgment on record.

The ruling, in U.S. District Court in San Diego on Thursday, was a victory for Alcatel-Lucent, the networking equipment company. Its forebears include Bell Laboratories, which was involved in the development of MP3 almost two decades ago.

At issue is the way the Windows Media Player software from Microsoft plays audio files using MP3, the most common method of distributing music on the Internet. If the ruling stands, Apple and hundreds of other companies that make products that play MP3 files, including portable players, computers and software, could also face demands to pay royalties to Alcatel.

Microsoft and others have licensed MP3 - not from Alcatel- Lucent, but from a consortium led by the Fraunhofer Institute, a large German research organization that was involved in the format's development, along with Bell Labs and the French electronics company Thomson. The current case turns on two patents that Alcatel claims were developed by Bell Labs before it joined with Fraunhofer to develop MP3.

"Intellectual property is a core asset of the company," said Joan Campion, a spokeswoman for Alcatel-Lucent. "We will continue to protect and defend that asset."

Thomas Burt, the deputy general counsel of Microsoft, said the company would most likely petition the judge in the San Diego case, Rudi Brewster, to set aside or reduce the judgment. If Brewster does not, Microsoft will probably take the case to the U.S. appeals court in Washington, which hears patent cases.

Microsoft argued that one patent in question did not apply to its MP3 software and that the other was included in the Fraunhofer software that it paid to license.

Further, it argued that the damages sought by Alcatel were unreasonably high, pointing out that it paid Thomson, which represented the consortium in its dealings over the patent, a flat $16 million fee for the rights to the MP3 software.

Alcatel argued that the damages should be based on a royalty of 0.5 percent of the total value of Windows computers sold.

John Desmarais, a partner with Kirkland & Ellis who represented Alcatel, said the proposed damages were consistent with patent law. He said it was not appropriate to compare them with the $16 million Microsoft paid Thomson because the rights to the Bell Labs patents were far more valuable.

"It's like going to the supermarket and paying $1 for a bar of soap," he said. "That lets you use the soap. We were offering the equivalent of the right to make soap any way they wanted."

The jury supported Alcatel's arguments on every count except one.

It deadlocked on the question of whether Microsoft willfully infringed on the Bell Labs patents. If the jury had found that it did, Microsoft would have had to pay triple damages.

"Microsoft has been and to some degree continues to be at a competitive disadvantage, as it did not file for patents for many, many, many years," said Jack Russo, a patent lawyer with Russo & Hale in Palo Alto, California.

That makes it harder, he said, to work out deals with other large companies in which they exchange the rights to each other's patents.

Large companies like AT&T and IBM "have huge patent portfolios and that represents large and unpredictable risks for companies like Microsoft," he said. The judgment is part of a complex litigation by Alcatel to enforce claims related to Bell Labs patents. The case was initially brought against Dell and Gateway, which make computers using Microsoft software. Other trials are pending for technology related to speech recognition, user interfaces and video processing.

Microsoft has countered with a claim, filed with the International Trade Commission, that Alcatel is violating its patents related to messaging technology.

The largest award for a patent infringement case to date was the $909 million that Kodak was ordered to pay in 1990 to Polaroid for violating patents related to instant cameras.

The Supreme Court hears arguments this week in a case that will test the limits of what officers can do to stop speeding drivers in high-speed chases.

At issue before the court is whether a Georgia police officer went too far when he rammed his vehicle into a car driven by a fleeing 19-year-old -- a maneuver that left the motorist paralyzed.

Law enforcement officers around the country are anxiously watching the case, concerned that a ruling for the quadriplegic driver would put them in legal jeopardy for split-second decisions at crime scenes.

Meanwhile, civil liberties advocates and critics of police chases are concerned that a ruling for the officer in the case would give law enforcement the green light to use more aggressive tactics on the roads.

Law enforcement agencies should "authorize high-speed pursuits only when necessary," said Karen Blum, a law professor at Suffolk University in Boston, who filed a brief in the case for the National Police Accountability Project. "The tactics employed by (the officer in this case) present serious issues of police accountability and raise questions about police tactics."

The chase occurred in 2001 in Coweta County, Ga., a community about 30 miles southwest of Atlanta. Victor Harris, 19 at the time, was clocked driving 73 mph in a 55-mph zone. A county sheriff flashed his lights and turned on his siren, but Harris hit the gas and sped away. Deputy Timothy Scott joined the pursuit, which lasted for six minutes and covered almost 9 miles.

A trial court found that Harris drove between 70 and 90 mph, ran through two red lights, and bumped Scott's vehicle once. Nevertheless, Harris still used his turn indicators when passing other cars on the largely vacant roads.

Scott radioed a supervisor and got permission to use a "precision intervention technique" -- a maneuver for hitting another car that causes it to spin and then stop. But the deputy ultimately abandoned the technique because he and Harris were driving too fast on a wet, two-lane highway.

Instead, Scott hit Harris' car with his push bumper -- a move that caused the vehicle to careen down an embankment. Harris, who was not wearing a seat belt, was paralyzed from the neck down.

Harris filed a lawsuit against Scott, alleging violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment's guarantees against unreasonable seizures and excessive force.

A federal district court in Georgia ruled that the deputy could be held liable in civil court for using deadly force without having probable cause to believe the teenager had committed a serious crime or posed a threat to others. In December 2005, the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that decision.

Scott appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court, which hears oral arguments in the case on Monday.

The deputy was acting "reasonably," argued his attorney, Philip Savrin, because a "fleeing car can be a deadly weapon" and Scott "believed that his actions avoided a greater risk of serious injury or death."

Savrin added: "Scott personally observed Harris driving recklessly and dangerously at extremely high speeds, through red lights and on the wrong side of the road. Scott properly recognized that Harris was a continuing danger to the public, and he acted reasonably to defuse the danger."

The Supreme Court's ruling in the case is expected to set new benchmarks for when and how law enforcement officers can chase suspects and use their vehicles to stop them.

The issue is murky because the previous two rulings on the use of deadly force were roughly two decades ago -- and those did not deal with car chases.

For instance, in 1985, the Supreme Court said deadly force can be used when a suspect threatens an officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime causing serious physical harm.

In 1989, the high court said judges deciding whether the use of deadly force is reasonable must weigh the underlying crime involved, the immediate threat a suspect poses and whether the suspect is actively evading arrest.

Harris' attorney, Craig Jones, argued that Harris' only offense at the beginning of the police chase was speeding -- a relatively minor crime that did not warrant such a risky pursuit.

Jones warned that a ruling against his client would give law enforcement officers carte blanche to recklessly and "knowingly apply deadly force in circumstances when no life is in immediate danger in order to seize a fleeing traffic offender."

The US military lawyer for Australian Guantanamo Bay detainee David Hicks said Saturday that Hicks would spend years in court and could not get a fair trial before a US military commission. In remarks at a rally in Adelaide, US Marine Corps Maj. Michael Mori noted that the revised military commissions system could not be used to try American citizens and questioned how such a system could then be fair enough for foreign citizens. Mori said that he believed the military tribunals were designed to deliver guilty verdicts and asserted that even if a decision on Hicks' guilt or innocence comes relatively quickly, it would likely take two or more years before an appeal from Hicks or another detainee made it to the US Supreme Court.

Hicks is one of three high profile Guantanamo prisoners facing new charges announced by the US earlier this month. The original charges against Hicks, Canadian Omar Khadr and Yemeni Salim Hamdan and other detainees had to be dropped after the US Supreme Court ruled the original military commissions system was unconstitutional as initially established by presidential order. Hicks was picked up in Afghanistan in 2001 while allegedly fighting for the Taliban. US prosecutors claim that he trained at up to four terrorist camps. The charges against him must still be formally approved, but US Vice President Dick Cheney has said that Hicks will be among the first to be tried  after the DOD's convening authority makes a determination whether a military commission should be convened to consider the charges.

The International Criminal Court in The Hague is scheduled to rule Monday on the genocide suit filed in 1993 by Bosnia-Herzegovina against Yugoslavia.

Basing its charges on the 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide, Bosnia brought the case before the United Nations high court demanding damages.

In the 1990s, Serb-dominated Yugoslavia moved militarily against its regions that were seeking independence. Serbia stands as the accused since the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The case is the first in which the UN court will apply the 1948 convention.

The Bosnian genocide case is not connected with trials by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, before which individual war crimes suspects must personally answer. The tribunal, which has already ruled that the 1995 massacre of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica was genocide.

Earlier Friday, 46 of 49 countries participating in the two-day Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions agreed to an action plan to develop a new international treaty to ban the use of cluster munitions by 2008. Romania, Poland and Japan refused to sign the Oslo Declaration. The United States, Russia, Israel, and China chose not to attend the conference. Cluster munitions are considered by many to be inaccurate weapons designed to spread damage indiscriminately and could therefore be considered illegal [CMC backgrounder] under multiple provisions of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (1977).

The Democratic-controlled Montana Senate voted 27-21 Friday to give second-reading approval to a bill that would eliminate the death penalty in Montana. Third reading is slated for February 24 before the measure goes to the Republican-controlled state House of Representatives.

Eleven US states have recently suspended the death penalty pending review of the manner in which the death penalty is administered. In early-February, Tennessee governor suspended executions pending procedural review. In January a North Carolina state judge issued an injunction blocking executions there until Governor Mike Easley issues new procedures to execute capital defendants without the presence of doctors. Capital punishment has also been suspended in Florida, California, and New Jersey, Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, Ohio, and South Dakota.